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Abstract 
Corporate governance is regarded as the key foundation for effective organizational performance and for 
organizations to be more productive, governed and controlled. The level of collapse of institutions and failure of 
firms across the world has also emphasized the need to study the ways by which organizations are governed and 
controlled. Despite these advancements, organizations are still faced with challenges such as the separation of 
ownership and control. Formal legal and regulatory obligations are part of the external incentive structure designed 
to ensure that competing companies abide by common standards of fairness, transparency, accountability, and 
responsibility to protect shareholders, consumers, workers, the environment, and even competitors from abusive 
practices. The general objective of the study was to examine the impact of corporate governance and external 
mechanism on organizational performance. The specific objectives of the study were to examine if separation of 
ownership and control affects the performance of listed manufacturing company in Nigeria and to determine the 
significant effect of laws/regulators on the performance of listed manufacturing company in Nigeria. The 
population of this study comprised all quoted manufacturing companies in the Nigerian Stock Exchange as at 2019. 
The study adopted secondary data. The secondary data was extracted from the Annual Reports of the sampled 
companies for a period of ten (10) years (2010-2019). The descriptive method which includes frequency tables, 
percentage, mean and standard deviation was used in describing and explaining information obtained from audited 
annual report of quoted manufacturing company while the quantitative method includes regression analysis. The 
main findings from the empirical analysis are that there is a significant relationship and effect between separation 
of ownership and control on the performance of listed manufacturing company given a P-value of 0.0005, R-
Squared of 0.9712, adjusted R2 of 0.9481 and F-value of 42.14. Also, the analysis revealed that laws/regulators on 
the performance of listed manufacturing company in Nigeria (LR) is significant given a P-Value of 0.0017 and F-
Value of 51.10, R2 of 0.8031 and adjusted R2 of 0.6456. The empirical results of this study revealed that external 
mechanism of corporate governance has impact on the performance of manufacturing firms in Nigeria. Based on 
the findings and conclusion, the study therefore recommended that regulatory bodies should ensure that the 
Manufacturing Companies comply with the statutory rules and regulations of corporate governance act. 
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1. Introduction to the Study 
Corporate governance is regarded as the key foundation for effective organizational performance and for 
organizations to be more productive, governed and controlled. The level of collapse of institutions and failure of 
firms across the world has also emphasized the need to study the ways by which organizations are governed and 
controlled. Corporate governance is a system by which business corporations are directed and controlled 
(Babatunde and Olaniran, 2009). The corporate governance structure specifies the distribution of rights and 
responsibilities among different participants in the corporation, such as the board, managers, shareholders and 
other stakeholders, and spells out the rules and procedures for making decisions on corporate affairs. By doing 
this, it provides the structure through which the company objectives are set, and the means of attaining those 
objectives and monitoring performance.” It has been reported that the survival of firms is associated with the type 
of corporate governance and management followed in the organization (Shleifer, 2016). 
Corporate Governance also includes the relationships among the many stakeholders involved and the goals 
for which the corporation is governed. In contemporary business corporations, the main external stakeholder 
groups are shareholders, debt holders, trade creditors, suppliers, customer and communities affected by the 
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corporation’s activities (Hermalin, 2014). Informal stakeholders are the board of directors, executives and other 
employees. Corporate Governance guarantees that an enterprise is directed and controlled in a responsible, 
professional, and transparent manner with the purpose of safeguarding its long-term success which is intended to 
increase the confidence of shareholders and capital market investors (Oyejide, and Soyibo, 2016).  
Corporate governance comprises of two mechanisms, internal and external corporate governance. Internal 
corporate governance, giving priority to shareholder’s interest, operated on the board of directors to monitor top 
management (Metrick, 2012). On the other hand, external corporate governance monitors and controls manager’s 
behaviours by means of external regulations and force, in which many parties, such as suppliers, debtors 
(stakeholders), accountants, lawyers, and providers of credit and investment bank. In the past, so many corporate 
organizations have been caught of getting involved in unethical practices, for example the discovery of financial 
scam by the Central Bank of Nigeria after the consolidation exercise, involving seven top bank executives in 
Nigeria, which puts the credibility of their corporate image under suspicion, which further shocking investors’ 
confidence (Organization for Economic Corporation and Development, 2014). 
Apparently, corporate governance mechanism has been considered as fundamental in determining the 
performance of an organizational. Based in this fact, the study tends to examine the impact of corporate governance 
and external mechanism on organizational performance in Nigeria. 
 
2. Statement of the problem 
The emergence of corporate scandals, stronger demand for accountability, transparency and performance in the 
global arena has placed corporate governance at the center of strategic management debate (Miyajima Hideaki, 
Kenji Haramura, and Yoshinari Enami., 2015). Despite these advancements, organizations are still faced with 
challenges such as the separation of ownership and control (Metrick and Ishii, 2012). This separation leads to 
emergence of governance issues where the three main corporation’s stakeholders interplay. Since agency costs are 
relatively high for organizations with dispersed ownership of shares, shareholders demand greater information 
disclosure for monitoring purposes. The situation calls for strong corporate governance as transparency is reduced 
by ownership concentration. 
Formal legal and regulatory obligations are part of the external incentive structure designed to ensure that 
competing companies abide by common standards of fairness, transparency, accountability, and responsibility to 
protect shareholders, consumers, workers, the environment, and even competitors from abusive practices. A good 
legal and regulatory framework efficiently addresses the entry, operations, and exists of firms. The day-to day 
performance of a company’s shares on a stock exchange is a transparent reminder to managers and Owners of the 
company’s perceived viability and value. This assessment permits shareholders to assess management 
performance and gives managers an incentive to minimize the costs of equity, since failure to do so will make 
them vulnerable to takeover. The overall impact of the laws or regulations binding the corporate governance 
framework should advocate for the rule of law and transparency (Jensen, 2001). This deals with the possibility of 
corporate fraud and issues to do with ethics. 
It is based on this problem that the research seeks to study the impact of corporate governance and external 
mechanism on organizational performance in Nigeria; using listed manufacturing company in Nigeria as a case 
study. 
 
3. Research Objectives 
The general objective of the study is to examine the impact of corporate governance and external mechanism on 
organizational performance. The specific objectives of the study are; 
i. to examine if separation of ownership and control affects the performance of listed manufacturing company in 
Nigeria. 
ii. to determine the significance effect of laws/regulators on the performance of listed manufacturing company in 
Nigeria. 
 
4. Literature review 
4.1 Concept of Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance as a concept has varied definitions which ultimately describes how companies are managed 
and controlled. Babatunde and Olaniran (2009) Opined that corporate governance apparatus is twofold, internal 
and external. Internal Corporate governance embodies giving precedence to owner’s concerns and ensuring that 
the board checks on top management serving as a link between management and the owners. External corporate 
governance examines and controls executive actions by means of external policies concerning other stakeholders. 
Cadbury report (2012) emphasized that corporate governance deals with shareholders wealth maximization and 
efficient utilization of firms assets. 
Corporate governance characteristics are statutory requirements that protects outside shareholders from 
expropriation by administrators, insiders or managing shareholders. Where such mechanisms are in nonexistence, 
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difficulties of monitoring are suffered by outside investors while administrators or managers may misuse 
organizational assets at the expense of small shareholders and this will impact on the long run performance of 
firms (Ammar et al, 2013) Corporate governance is basically concerned with building trust, ensuring accountability 
and transparency as well as maintaining an effective channel of information disclosure which helps to bridge the 
gap between information available to directors and the information available to stakeholders thereby helping to 
resolve the agency problem and foster good performance of firms (Magbagbeola, 2015). 
 
4.2 External Mechanism of Corporate Governance 
i.  Laws/Regulations 
Firms have to abide by the regulatory and legislative requirements which are basically drawn from the host 
country’s specific circumstances, history and tradition. The regulatory and legislative framework differs from 
country to country. The overall corporate performance is greatly influenced by regulatory and legal environment 
within which the firm operates. The policy makers in turn should put in place a framework that is flexible enough 
to meet the needs of the corporations operating in widely different circumstances. The overall impact of the laws 
or regulations binding the corporate governance framework should advocate for the rule of law and transparency 
(Jensen, 2011). This deals with the possibility of corporate fraud and issues to do with ethics. Corporate governance 
practices and requirements are bound by an array of legal aspects such as securities regulation, company law, 
auditing and accounting standards, insolvency law, contract law, labour and tax laws. Human rights and 
environmental laws are also very important as these affect the overall treatment of the environment and labour. 
Labour should be fairly remunerated; health and safety issues should be of paramount importance. Social 
responsibility by the firms should be viewed and implemented as a developmental gesture of appreciation to the 
community in which the firm operates. Board of directors and management should prioritize this crucial obligation 
in order to earn respect and support from host communities and host country at large (Hermalin, 2014). 
ii. Ownership Concentration 
In financial and general management positive agency theory put forward that a wider spreading of share ownership 
is related with greater transparency. Jensen, (2011) contends that the separation of control and ownership creates 
agency costs as a result of differing and conflicting interests between owners and management. Since agency costs 
are relatively high for organizations with dispersed ownership of shares, shareholders demand greater information 
disclosure for monitoring purposes. The situation calls for strong corporate governance as transparency is reduced 
by ownership concentration. 
iii.  Foreign Ownership 
Strategic management scholars argue that when an organization goes international the uncertainty of a company’s 
business operations and complexity increases. Stakeholders are then likely to place greater pressure on the 
company to ensure it implements effective monitoring mechanisms. According to Gugler (2012) multinational 
organisations’ performance, behavior and consequences of their operations are closely monitored by international 
government agencies and political pressure groups. As a result, foreign investors are required to comply fully with 
all regulatory and statutory requirements of the host countries for their international subsidiaries. International 
subsidiaries will probably have more complicated financial reporting systems that facilitate greater disclosure in 
their end of year reports compared to local companies. There is indication of positive correlation between foreign 
ownership and corporate disclosure as established in recent studies by (Gompers et al., 2013). 
 
4.3 Theoretical Framework 
i. Agency Theory 
This theory propounded by Jensen and Meckling (1976) is based on the premise that when ownership of an 
organization is separated from control, managers acting as agents on behalf of the owners or principal are prone 
to pursuing their own interest to the detriment of the owners. It further emphasized that managers have interest 
which does not align with maximizing returns to shareholders thus creating agency problem between shareholders 
(principal) and directors (agents). The principal has to bear some agency cost in order to monitor the activities of 
the agent to ensure efficiency. 
ii.  Stakeholders’ theory 
According to Bessong and Tapang (2012), the concept of agency theory is narrow. This is because they identify 
shareholders as the only interest group of a corporate entity necessitating further exploration. By expanding the 
spectrum of interested parties, Wolfensohn, (2009) argue that, the stakeholder theory stipulates that, a corporate 
entity invariably seeks to provide a balance between the interests of its diverse stakeholder in order to ensure that 
each interest’s constituency receives some degree of satisfaction. In separate contribution, According to Shleifer 
(2016), stakeholder theory appears better in explaining the role of corporate governance than the agency theory by 
highlighting the various constituent; employees, banks, governance, relevant stakeholders.  
Freeman (2004) provide a comprehensive review of the stakeholders’ theory of corporate governance which 
points out the presence of many parties with competing interests in the operations of the firm. They also emphasize 
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the role of non-market mechanisms such as the size of the board, committee structure as important to firm 
performance (Shleifer and Vishny, 2016). Stakeholder theory has become more prominent because many 
researchers have recognized that the activities of a corporate entity impact on the external environment requiring 
accountability of the organization to a wider audience than simply its shareholders (i.e. stakeholders). For instance, 
Savage, Nix, Metrick and Ishii, (2012) proposed that companies are no longer the instrument of shareholder alone 
but exist within society and therefore, have responsibilities to that society. One must however point out that large 
recognition of this fact has rather been a recent phenomenon. Indeed, it has been realized that economic value is 
created by people who voluntarily come together and corporate to improve everyone’s position (Freeman, 2004). 
 
4.4 Empirical Review 
Several empirical studies have investigated corporate governance and performance of firms (Adebayo et al 2014; 
and Ammar et al;(2013) ). But Gadi, Emesuanwu and Shammah, (2015) extended their study by examining 
corporate governance and financial performance of Micro Finance Banks in North Central Nigeria. Their study 
sampled 23 micro finance banks that board composition and composition of board committees have significant 
relationship with banks financial performance. Similarly, Adenikinju (2017) studied 30 manufacturing companies 
quoted on the Nigerian Stock Exchange Market between 2003 and 2007. The findings portray a significant but 
weak link between board size and Manufacturing firms in Nigeria. In addition, Ogbechie and Koufopoulos (2010) 
investigated the correlation between corporate governance and board practices in the Nigerian banking industry. 
The result discovered that a standard board size comprising of all board committees is ideal for any organizational 
set up. Similarly, Adebayo, Ibrahim, Yusuf and Omah (2014) studied corporate governance and performance of 
organizations. The study adopted quantitative methodological framework. The finding showed that board size, 
board skills, management skills and size of audit committee are positively associated with performance in 
organizations. 
According to Adenikinju and Ayorinde (2017), who examined the link between corporate attributes of board 
size and market value of firms, using a sample of six companies, between 2004-2012, results from the study 
indicate a negative correlation between board size and the market value of equity. In addition, Ammar, Asif and 
Ammar (2013) examined Corporate governance and performance from the Pakistan context, the study utilized data 
from the website of Karachi stock exchange and financial statements of sampled listed companies for the period 
of five years 2007-2011. The findings revealed a positive association between board size and firm performance. 
Yermack (1996) also investigated the relation between board size and firm performance. 452 sampled industrial 
firms for the period 1984-1991 were used for the study, concluding that the smaller the board sizes, the better the 
performance. Monks and Minow (1995) argued that large boardroom tends to be slow in decision making and 
hence can be an obstacle to change. Previous researchers investigated corporate governance and Firm performance 
but this paper stands to differ by examining corporate governance and external mechanism on organizational 
performance of manufacturing companies proxied by determinant of external mechanism of corporate governance 
in an organization which include; separation of ownership, ownership structure laws and regulation e.t.c 
 
5. Methodology 
The population of this study comprised all quoted manufacturing companies in the Nigerian Stock Exchange as at 
2019, and the number of such companies is sixty-three (63)  (NSE Bulletin, 2019). Stratified Sampling was used 
for this study. Stratified sampling is a method of sampling from a population which can be partitioned into 
subpopulations. This technique was used to select a company each from each sub sector of the manufacturing 
industry, which therefore makes four companies as sample size of the study. These companies are Nestle Nig. 
PLC, Lafarge Africa Plc., Presco Plc and A.G. Leventis  Nig Plc.  Nestle Nigeria Plc, has been in existence for a 
long period of time and they operate in consumer goods industry, Lafarge Africa Plc is a manufacturing firm within 
the industrial goods/ building materials subsectors, Presco is in agriculture industrial goods subsector while A.G. 
Leventis Nig Plc is a conglomerates majorly involved in automobiles. The study adopted secondary data. The 
secondary data will be extracted from the Annual Reports of the sampled companies for a period of ten (10) years 
(2010-2019). Considering the nature and purpose of the research work, inferential method was used for the analysis 
of the various data collected. The quantitative method includes regression analysis and pairwise correlation 
analysis which was used in explaining information obtained from audited annual report of quoted manufacturing 
company. 
In other to examine if separation of ownership and control affects the performance of listed manufacturing 
company in Nigeria in objective one of the study, the following model-equation was designed;  
SEPoc = α0+ β1SOit + β2SCit + β3ROIit + β4ROEit + εit….…Eq (1) 
To determine the significance effect of laws/regulators on the performance of listed manufacturing company in 
Nigeria in objective two we adopt the following model  
LR = α0+ β1SRit + β2AASit + β3ROIit + β4ROEtit +εit….  ….Eq (2) 
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6. Result and discussion 
Table 1  
Results of the Regression Analysis Showing the Relationship between Separation of Ownership and Control 





Coefficient  Standard 
Error 
T p>|t| [95% conf. interval] 
SEPoc  SO 0.0002971 0.0002509 1.18 0.290 -0.000348    0.0009421 
 SC -0.0055759 0.0007714 -7.23 0.001 -0.0075587  -0.0035931 
 ROI -3852.089 651.6826 -5.91 0.002 -5527.292     -2176.885 
 ROE -4.844139 0.4569881 -10.6 0.000 -6.018864    -3.66941 
 Constant 137589.1 14354.03 9.59 0.000 100690.9     174487.4 
R-squared =0.9712       Adj. R-squared = 0.9481            P≤0.05        F (4,5)= 42.14 
Source: Researcher’s Computation, 2020. 
Table 2  
Result of pairwise correlation between Separation of Ownership and Control on the Performance of Listed 
Manufacturing Company 
 SEPoc SO SC ROI ROE 
SEPoc 1.0000     
SO -0.5608 1.0000    
SC -0.3035 0.4147 1.0000   
ROI 0.1970 -0.4701 0.0129 1.0000  
ROE -0.6714* 0.4742 -0.3219 -0.6368* 1.0000 
Source: Researcher’s Computation, 2020. 
A multiple regression analysis whose equation is presented in Table 1 found that the coefficient of 
determination (R-square) is 0.9712. This shows that the predictive power of the independent variable (separation 
of ownership and control variables) as used to explain variation in the dependent variable (performance of an 
organization) is about 97% with a high adjusted R-square of (0.9481). The combined P value of 0.0005 and F-
Value of 42.14 shows there is a significant relationship and effect between the variables examined. The regression 
equation is as shown below. 
SEPoc = 137589.1 + 0.000297SO - 0.00558SC – 3852.089ROI – 
4.844ROE…………………………………………………………………… 
The result shows that a unit increase in SEPoc will show a marginal positive contribution of 0.00029 to 
variation of SO, SC had a marginal negative contribution of about 0.0055 to the variation in SO. ROI indicated a 
negative contribution of 3852.089 to changes in SEPoc, while ROE showed a negative contribution of about 3.844 
to changes in SEPoc. Furthermore, three of the four variables are significant in predicting the changes in SEPoc. 
These are SC with a value of 7.23 and p- value of0.001, ROI with a t-value of 0.002 and p-value of 0.000 and ROE 
with a t and p values of 10.60 and 0.000 respectively.  
A pairwise correlation test between the variables indicates similar result given correlation between SEPoc 
and other explanatory variables. The coefficient of correlation (R) between SO and SEPoc is (-0.5608), an 
indication of moderate negative relationship. SC has an insignificant negative correlation of (0.3035) with SEPoc 
and the variable OS has a weak but positive correlation coefficient of (0.1970) with SEPoc. ROE shows a negative 
but significant correlation coefficient of (0.6714) with SEPoc. as shown in table 2. 
Table 3  
Result of Regression Analysis showing the Relationship between Laws/Regulators and the Performance of 





Coefficient  Standard 
Error 
T p>|t| [95% conf. interval] 
LR SR 1.319006    6.34784 0.21 0.844 -17.63665    14.99864 
 
 AAS 97.06288    35.45239 2.74 0.041 -188.1961    -5.929617 
 ROI -141881.8 40395.71 -3.51 0.017 -245722.3    -38041.3 
 ROE -17.49959    6.487834 -2.70 0.043 -34.1771   -.8220864 
 Constant 4090446    974707.2 4.20 0.009 1584881     6596011 
R-squared = 0.8031     Adj. R-squared = 0.6456          P≤ 0.05        F (4,5)= 51.10 
 Source: Researcher’s computation, 2020. 
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Table 4  
Result of a pairwise correlation between Laws/Regulators and the Performance of Listed Manufacturing 
Company in Nigeria 
 LR SR AAS ROI ROE 
LR 1.0000     
SR 0.3177 1.0000    
AAS -0.3725 0.1195 1.0000   
ROI -0.0303 0.1970 -0.6235 1.0000  
ROE -0.5105 -0.6839 0.3073 -0.6171 1.0000 
Source: Researcher’s computation, 2020. 
Findings based on the result obtained in Table 3,  indicate that R-square = 0.8031, which implies that 
approximately 80% of the variation in the dependent variable (LR) is  caused by the explanatory variables included 
in the model and remained robust at 0.6456 after adjusting for degree of freedom. Moreover, the explanatory 
variables are jointly significant at 5% level as captured by F-statics (51.10) with a corresponding P-value of the 
0.0017. The general model of the equation is presented in equation 4.3 below: 
NP= 4090446 + 1.319SR + 97.062AAS – 141881.8IROI – 
17.49959ROE…..………………………………………………………………… (4.2) 
The result implies that three of the four explanatory variables are significant in explaining variation in LR. 
These are AAS, ROI and ROE with a t and p values of (2.74 and 0.041), (-3.51 and 0.017) and (-2.70 and 0.043) 
respectively. Moreso, two of the variables (SR and AAS) shows positive effect on LR, while the other two variables 
(ROI and ROE) exhibit negative effect. A unit increase in SR and AAS will lead to (1.319) and (97.062) increase 
in LR respectively. Furthermore, ROI and ROE were found to have negative coefficient of -141881.8 and -
17.49959 respectively. However the combined statistics shows that there is a significant relationship between 
effect of laws/regulators and the performance of listed manufacturing company in Nigeria given F (4, 5) = 51.10 
and P-value of 0.0017. 
Moreover, the pairwise correlation test between the study variables in table 4 further affirms the relationship 
between laws/regulators on the performance of listed manufacturing company in Nigeria. The correlation 
coefficient (R) between SR and LR was found to be 0.3177, an indication of low positive relationship between the 
two variables. AAS shows correlation coefficient of -0.3725 with LR. ROI shows negative and insignificant 
coefficient of -0.0303, while ROE and AAS exhibit a negative but moderate correlation with a coefficient of -
0.5105 as shown in table 4 
 
6. Discussion of Findings 
The first objective seeks to examine if separation of ownership and control affects the performance of listed 
manufacturing company within a period of ten years (2010-2019). Findings from the study revealed that there is a 
significant relationship and effect between separation of ownership and control on the performance of listed 
manufacturing company. Components such as Separation of ownership and control (SEPoc),  Share of ownership 
(SO), Return on Investment (ROI), Return on Equity (ROE)  were found to have a significant effect on the 
performance of listed manufacturing company (proxied by Separation of ownership and control (SEPoc) given a 
P-value of 0.0005, R-Squared of 0.9712, adjusted R2 of 0.9481 and F-value of 42.14. Furthermore the study 
evaluates the Relationship between laws/regulators on the performance of listed manufacturing company in 
Nigeria. Results from the analysis revealed that the combined effect of laws/regulators on the performance of listed 
manufacturing company in Nigeria (LR) is significant given a P-Value of 0.0017 and F-Value of 51.10, R2 of 
0.8031 and adjusted R2 of 0.6456.  
 
7. Conclusion and Recommendations 
This study examines the impact of impact of corporate governance and external mechanism on organizational 
performance in Nigeria within a period of ten (10) years (2010-2019). The empirical results of this study revealed 
that external mechanism of corporate governance has impact on the performance of manufacturing firms in Nigeria. 
In relation to the objective of the study, the study concludes that there is a significant relationship and effect 
between separation of ownership and control on the performance of listed manufacturing company. Components 
such as Share of Ownership (SO), Separation of Control (SC), Return on Investment (ROI), and Return on Equity 
were found to have a significant effect on the performance of manufacturing firms in Nigeria (proxied by 
Separation of Ownership and Control (SEPoc). Also, there is significant positive relationship between 
laws/regulators on the performance of listed manufacturing company in Nigeria (Law/Regulations).  Based on the 
findings and conclusion, the study therefore recommends that regulatory bodies should ensure that the 
manufacturing companies comply with the statutory rules and regulations of corporate governance act. A fair and 
balanced board composition should be adopted by manufacturing companies to ensure proper direction of strategy 
and long-term maximization of owners’ value. The linkage between external mechanism and firm performance 
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implied that for return on investment (ROI) to increase, there is need to link their operations and output to the 
overall board operations. 
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